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We assess whether the voting records of central bank boards are informative about 
future monetary policy. First, we specify a theoretical model of central bank board 
decision-making and simulate the voting outcomes. Three different versions of 
model are estimated with simulated data: 1) democratic, 2) consensual and 3) 
opportunistic. These versions differ in the degree of informational influence 
between the chairman and other board members influence prior to the voting. The 
model shows that the voting pattern is informative about future monetary policy 
provided that the signals about the optimal policy rate are noisy and that there is 
sufficient independence in voting across the board members, which is in line with 
the democratic version. Next, the model predictions are tested on real data on five 
inflation targeting countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). Subject to various sensitivity tests, it is found that the democratic 
version of the model corresponds best to the real data and that in all countries the 
voting records are informative about future monetary policy, making a case for 
publishing the records.   
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Monetary policy transparency has increased dramatically over the last two decades (Geraats, 2009; 
Posen, 2003). Nowadays, central banks typically communicate effectively with the public and 
explain their policies in great detail. Every monetary policy decision is accompanied by minutes 
or press releases that outline the arguments that central bankers expressed during the monetary 
policy meeting. The most transparent central banks where bank boards
1 decide by majority vote 
also release attributed voting records, typically together with the minutes.
2 In this paper we aim to 
examine whether voting records are informative about future policy. From the voting records, we 
are able to calculate an indicator called  , defined as the difference between the average 
policy rate voted for by the individual board members and the policy rate that is the outcome of 
the majority vote. Our theoretical model examines under which conditions it is more likely that 
there will be a rate hike (reduction) in the future when there is a minority vote for higher (lower) 
rates than the decided-on rate. In addition, an extended empirical model tests whether the skew 
conveys new information in addition to all the other information already incorporated into 
financial market expectations prior to the monetary policy meeting. 
 
While some previous research has extensively examined the information content of voting 
records in the case of the UK (Gerlach-Kristen, 2004), many other central banks’ voting records 
have not been examined empirically yet. Similarly, there is also a lack of theoretical studies 
examining whether voting results are useful for understanding future monetary policy. 
 
On the theoretical side, we fully specify a model of the central bank committee decision-making 
process, simulate the decisions taken by the model committee and assess the informative power 
of the voting pattern for future monetary policy. The basic version of our model is similar to the 
model of Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008a) in acknowledging the endogenous nature of the 
status-quo decision in the central bank decision-making process. Besides the endogenous status 
quo, our model also incorporates uncertainty and time dependence in optimal monetary policy as 
well as the private information of individual committee members (Gerlach-Kristen, 2008). We 
use several alternative models of monetary policy committee decision-making that differ (among 
other things) in the degree of informational influence among its members and that are related to 
the models already found in the relevant literature (Gerlach-Kristen, 2008; Riboni and Ruge-
Murcia, 2010; Weber, 2008). 
                                                                                       
1 The decision-making bodies in central banks are typically called either monetary policy committees or bank boards. 
We use the two terms interchangeably in our paper. 
2 Fry et al. (2000) reports that approximately 90% of central banks around the world make decisions in committees.   2
 
What distinguishes our model from the already existing ones is combination of endogeneity of 
the status-quo policy with time varying heterogeneity of preferences of the monetary policy 
committee members. The first feature allows us to talk about the   variable in the first place 
as the committee decisions are made by vote between two alternatives. Second feature then 
ensures that typical outcome of such vote will not be unanimous or in other words that the   
variable will attain non-zero values. 
 
Our theoretical model shows that the voting record contains important information about future 
monetary policy provided that the signals about the optimal policy rate are noisy and a sufficient 
degree of information independence exists among the committee members. Even if both of 
those conditions hold, the informative power of the voting record can be overridden by high 
volatility of the economic environment or by enough noise in the committee members’ 
information, with a larger committee size counteracting both of those effects. 
 
In the empirical part, this paper examines the informative power of voting results in five 
inflation-targeting countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the UK, where 
monetary policy is decided by a majority vote of at least formally independent committee or 
board members. In consequence, our research gives a greater international perspective than 
previously published case studies and is able to draw conclusions that are not country-specific. 
 
Our empirical results confirm the theoretical conclusions. The voting record is informative of 
future monetary policy changes in all the sample countries. It adds news to the information set 
used in financial market expectations prior to the voting record announcement. This result is 
robust to various sensitivity checks such as to different sample periods or to the timing and style 
of the voting record announcement. Our dataset provides two ‘natural experiment’ setups, where 
we can quantify the effect of publicly unavailable voting results (for the case of Poland) and the 
effect of publicly unavailable names of voting members (for the Czech case). The voting record is 
informative about future policy in these two setups as well. This implies that that releasing the 
names themselves is less important for transparency than releasing the voting outcome itself, but 
releasing voting record in a timely fashion is beneficial for greater monetary policy predictability. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the related literature. Section 3 introduces a 
theoretical model of central bank board decision-making. Section 4 presents the institutional   3
background of monetary policy decision-making in our sample countries. The empirical 
methodology is discussed in section 5. Section 6 gives the results. Section 7 offers concluding 
remarks. Appendices containing details of the theoretical model (Appendix A1), details of the 
institutional background of monetary policy decision-making (Appendix A2) and a data 
description (Appendix A3) follow. 
 
2 Related Literature 
On the most general level the question of whether the voting records of central bank boards and 
monetary policy committees (MPCs) reveal information about future changes in monetary policy 
is related to the literature on central bank communication and central bank transparency, 
surveyed by Blinder et al. (2008) and Geraats (2002, 2009) respectively. The general conclusion of 
both strands of literature is that the way central banks communicate to the public and their 
degree of transparency matters for monetary policy. Most of the theoretical and empirical studies 
also indicate the benefits of more open and more transparent central bank behaviour. However, 
not all the studies reach unequivocal conclusions. For example, the model in Morris and Shin 
(2002) leaves open the possibility that more information provided by a central bank is welfare 
reducing, while Meade and Stasavage (2008) show that the Federal Reserve’s decision to release 
full transcripts of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings decreased the incentives 
of its participants to voice dissenting opinions. Swank et al. (2008) analyze the reputational issues 
in expert committees and disincentive to dissent. Winkler (2000) draws similar conclusions and 
puts forward a conceptual framework to distinguish different aspects of transparency. 
 
From the theoretical side, the question of whether the voting records of bank board members are 
informative about future monetary policy is virtually untouched. One of the reasons is the 
difficulty of modelling committee decision-making with members who hold possibly different 
beliefs and objectives in the uncertain monetary environment. Another difficulty is the dynamic 
nature of central bank decision-making, as a policy rate adopted today becomes the status-quo 
policy for the next meeting. 
 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear what is the appropriate assumption to be made about the way 
bank boards reach decisions. While in reality the chairman usually holds most of the proposal 
power, empirical evidence in Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) suggests that the real-world features 
are better captured by what they call a consensus model in which the adopted policy is equal to 
the most preferred policy of the next-to-median member.   4
 
Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008a) try to model central bank decision-making taking into account 
its dynamic nature. They show that even in periods in which policy-makers’ preferences do not 
differ, policy-makers may fail to reach a consensus and change the policy from the status quo, 
due to the possibility of future disagreement. However, it is not clear whether their model can 
support the information content of voting behaviour, despite the fact that it produces persistence 
and strong autocorrelation of policy rates. 
 
Disregarding the dynamic nature of central bank policy-making, Gerlach-Kristen (2008) 
investigates the role of the MPC chairman in committee decision-making in a model that 
generates real-world-like dissenting frequencies. The possibility of dissent arising is due to the 
fact that individual policy-makers receive private information about the unobserved optimal 
interest rate. Differences in private information sets among the MPC members then give rise to 
different votes by the time the policy decision is made. In a similar vein, Farvaque et al. (2009) 
examines how different decision rules in monetary policy committees affect the volatility of 
interest rates. 
 
The model in Weber (2010) then supports the basic intuition that the publication of voting 
records reveals the bank board’s opinion heterogeneity and thus provides more information to 
the financial markets than the publication of the final decision only. Better informed financial 
markets are then able to better predict the central bank’s future behaviour, providing a rationale 
for the publication of voting records. 
 
Similarly, the empirical literature investigating the informative power of voting records is rather 
scant. This is mainly due to the fact that the practice of publishing the voting records of board 
members has been adopted relatively recently and several central banks make their voting records 
public only in the transcripts of their monetary policy meetings, published with a several-year lag. 
 
For the MPC of the Bank of England, Gerlach-Kristen (2004) shows that for the period 1997–
2002 the difference between the average voted-for and actually implemented policy rate is 
informative about changes in the policy rate in the future, a conclusion robust to the inclusion of 
different measures of market expectations. In a similar spirit and using the same measure of 
dissent in the MPC, Fujiki (2005) reaches a similar conclusion for the Bank of Japan, and 
Andersson, Dillen and Sellin (2006) do likewise for the Riksbank.   5
 
The empirical literature trying to estimate the reaction functions of individual bank board 
members using information about their voting behaviour is closely related. In this case, 
information about the individual members’ votes is used to predict their preferred policy rate 
given the state of the economy and hence to better forecast future monetary policy decisions. For 
the Federal Reserve, Chappell, McGregor and Vermilyea (2005) estimate the individual reaction 
functions of FOMC members. For the Bank of England MPC, Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006, 
2010), Brooks, Harris and Spencer (2008), Besley, Meads and Surico (2008) and Riboni and Ruge-
Murcia (2008b) conduct a similar exercise. 
 
The general conclusion emerging from these studies is that there is often significant evidence of 
heterogeneity among bank board members. In combination with the assumption that monetary 
policy is better conducted in an environment with no information asymmetry between the central 
bank and the markets, the publication of voting records revealing the heterogeneity of the bank 
board members is desirable. 
 
3 A Model of Central Bank Board Decision-Making 
In this section we introduce a theoretical model of the central bank board decision-making 
process and investigate under which conditions the voting pattern can be informative about 
future policy. The general objective is to fully specify the model, simulate the path of the 
decisions, recording the preferences of the individual committee members, and use those in a 
regression similar to our benchmark study Gerlach-Kristen (2004), which is also the starting 
point of our empirical analysis. In this regression, we test whether the skew indicator is 
informative about future interest rate changes. 
 
3.1 Model setup 
The model is set in an infinite horizon with discrete periods denoted by  , in each of 
which the monetary policy committee or board takes a decision about the policy instrument with 
a policy adopted at   denoted by  . Although we call   the interest rate, it can stand for any 
standard monetary policy instrument. 
 
There are   (  being an even number) ‘normal’ board members   (each referred to as ‘he’) and 
one proposer or chairman   (referred to as ‘she’). Therefore, the committee size is odd. In each 
period  , decision-making is done by a standard majority rule with two alternatives pitched   6
against each other. The first alternative is the current status-quo policy  , which is equal to the 
policy adopted at  , i.e.  . The second alternative is the policy proposed by the 
chairman, which we denote by  .
3 The alternative that gains a majority of the votes then 
becomes the new policy  . For mathematical convenience we assume that a   who cannot 
propose anything better than   indeed proposes   (instead of proposing a policy that would be 
rejected for certain). 
 
The committee tries to set policy   so as to match the uncertain ‘state of the world’ denoted by 
, where for inflation-targeting central banks   can be interpreted as the interest rate that is 
compatible with achieving the inflation target over time. We assume that the per-period utility 
function of all committee members is quadratic around   and is given by  . Note that 
even though the board members share an equal goal embedded in a common utility function, 
their behaviour can (and will) depend on their private information, which is not necessarily 
homogeneous. 
 
We assume that the unobserved state of the world follows an   process given by 
, where  , with   being an   shock with distribution  . That 
is, the optimal monetary policy changes over time, with the current optimal interest rate being 
influenced by the previous-period optimal interest rate and eventually converging to some long-
run value compatible with a stable state of the economy. With our interpretation of   as the 
optimal interest rate it might seem unrealistic to assume that it can attain negative values, but the 
whole model and all the results are invariant to adding a constant to the optimal interest rate. In 
Appendix A1, we provide a robustness check to show that the   assumption can be 
changed into AR(2) without altering the conclusions. 
 
To generate non-homogeneous votes among the committee members we assume that each 
member   has an imperfect signal   about   given by  , where the noise   is   
with distribution  . The assumption of non-homogeneous views of the individual 
committee members about the state of the economy is perfectly in line with the observed 
practice. Individual committee members often rely both on a staff forecast and on their privately 
formed views about which risks should be attached to the staff forecast and additional privately 
collected information about the state of the economy (Budd, 1998). It is assumed that for all  s 
                                                                                       
3 Chairman's proposal can in principle be equal to status-quo. Meetings with no change in policy then can be result 
of either chairman proposing policy equal to the status-quo or chairman's proposal being rejected.   7
 and that   has  . We assume that the chairman has the same or a higher 
capacity to collect private information compared to the other committee members and hence the 
same or a higher capacity to reduce noise. It follows that  .
4 
 
The proposal power of chairman along with heterogeneous preferences among the committee 
members generated by different signals implies that interpretation of our model fits best final 
stage of a typical monetary policy meeting. Common practice in many central banks is to start 
with a free format discussion of economic developments after which, typically the chairman, 
proposes policy which is then approved or rejected in a formal vote. 
 
Next we make some assumptions in order to make the model tractable. We assume that the 
whole committee learns the previous state of the world at the beginning of each period before 
making its next decision, i.e.   is known by the time the  -period decision is being made. The 
alternative to this assumption would be not to reveal   and have the board members use 
Kalman filtering to update their beliefs about the optimal interest rate. While this extension is 
possible, we think it would add no substantive insight while greatly complicating the analysis. 
 
The timing of events in period   is as follows: i) the last-period state of the world   is revealed, 
ii) nature determines all the random variables in the model, hence setting   and all the signals of 
the board members, iii) the signals about the current state of the world  s are revealed to all the 
members and remain their private information, iv)   makes proposal  , v) voting takes place 
between   and the status quo (i.e. the last-period policy)   and the winning alternative 
becomes the new policy  , and finally, vi) the players collect their utilities and the decision-
making process moves to  . 
 
We will focus on a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium in which strategies are measurable only 
with respect to payoff-relevant variables (histories) and do not depend on time (Maskin and 
Tirole, 2001). This allows us to drop the time subscripts and the notation becomes   for the 
status quo,   for the proposal,   for the previous-period optimal interest rate, and   for signals 
about the current optimal interest rate. The current optimal interest rate will be denoted by  , 
with the bar denoting variables that will become known in the next period (the same applies to 
                                                                                       
4 We could have generated heterogeneous preferences among the committee member by assuming fixed innate 
differences in their preferences. But with fixed pattern of heterogeneity, there is no reason why voting record should 
predict future decisions. On the other hand our assumption of private signals generating heterogeneous preferences 
can be alternatively viewed as an assumption of different innate preferences among the committee members, but one 
following stochastic pattern.   8
the other variables, i.e.   is the signal about the next-period optimal interest rate player   receives 
at the beginning of the next period). With this notation the   process for the optimal 
interest rate becomes   and the signals are determined according to  . The 
information set of each player   is thus  . 
 
’s strategy in this game is to offer the proposal, depending on information set variables and 
denoted by  , that maximizes her expected utility. It will be a solution to   
      (1)   
where   is a discount factor common to all board members and   denotes the policy 
adopted, depending on the status quo   and proposal  . Set   is assumed to be a set of discrete 
values in which the interest rate can be set, i.e.   is a set of integer multiples of some value  . 
The notation for the expectation operator   captures the idea that   will calculate her 
expectations differently based on a model of the committee members’ behaviour, which we 
specify below. Finally,   is  ’s continuation value utility from a game 
starting with the status quo  , the last-period optimal interest rate   and a signal about the 
current optimal interest rate  . 
 
The strategy of each   member   is a simple binary decision to vote for or reject  ’s proposal 
given the status quo   and all the remaining variables in information set  . We restrict our 
attention to stage-undominated strategies (Baron and Kalai, 1993) in which player   simply votes 
for an alternative providing higher expected utility. This avoids equilibria in which players vote 
for an alternative they do not prefer simply because their vote cannot change the final decision. 
Along with the assumption above, this implies that  , given the status quo  ,  ’s proposal   and 
’s signal  , votes for   if and only if   
   (2) 
where again   is the continuation value utility of player   from a game starting with the 
status quo  , with the previous-period optimal interest rate   and signal  . Notice that the voting 
rule specifies that an indifferent   votes for  ’s proposal. Hence, when  ’s offer   equals the 
current status quo  , pro-forma voting takes place within the committee and  ’s proposal is 
unanimously approved. 
   9
3.2 Committee members’ behaviour 
One way to proceed would be to assume full rationality on the part of all the committee 
members in the standard sense, solve for the model equilibrium (which would involve 
complicated expectation updating and signal extraction problems) and then simulate the path of 
the decisions for a random draw of model stochastic variables. However, the presence of 
information asymmetry among the board members, along with the infinite horizon framework, 
makes derivation of a full solution unfeasible. 
 
Besides technical complexity, such a model does not capture the different modes or codes of 
conduct found among real-world central bank committees (see Blinder, 2004, or Chappell, 
McGregor and Vermilyea, 2005, for a discussion) and the possible degrees of informational 
influence among their members. A purely rational model also implicitly assumes a lack of other 
motives on the part of central bank committee members, such as acknowledgement of the 
chairman’s authority and better expertise or career concerns manifested by a willingness to adopt 
the chairman’s opinion. In effect we view the fully rational model as an unrealistic description of 
reality. 
 
For this reason we specify four different models of committee behaviour, for which we solve for 
equilibrium and then proceed with the simulations. The first three models, which we label as 
democratic, consensual and opportunistic based on  ’s behaviour, assume that the committee members 
do not take into account the impact of their actions on their future decisions. Formally, this is 
achieved by assuming  .
5 By making this assumption we break the first intertemporal link in 
the committee decision-making mentioned above. Current policy still determines the future status 
quo, but the committee members do not take this fact into account. This assumption, for 
environments with  , implies that the policy proposal could in fact come from a different 
board member at each meeting, so that the role of the chairman is not institutional. When 
, that is, when chairman   is better informed, her proposal power reflects her position 
as the best-informed board member. The fourth and last model, which we label intertemporal 
democratic, maintains the first intertemporal link but breaks the second one, i.e. it assumes that the 
optimal monetary policy is independent across periods. Formally, this is achieved by assuming 
                                                                                       
5 Assumption that policy-makers ignore effect of their current actions on their future decisions is common (Gerlach-
Kristen 2008; Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 2008b, Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 2010, Weber 2010) although it manifests 
through the   assumption only in the first paper. In Riboni and Ruge Murcia 200b and in Weber 2010 there is 
no decision making between status-quo and proposed alternative. And in Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 2010 even though 
policy-makers are forward looking when determining their most preferred interest rate, their do not take into 
account effect of their vote on future status-quo.   10
 in the   process determining the optimal monetary policy rate  . Below we describe 
the models, relegating the formal details to Appendix A1. 
 
Notice that the first three models, described below, embed different degrees of informational 
influence among chairman   and the remaining   members. In the democratic model there is 
little or no influence, as   is not influenced by the information that the   members have, and 
they are not influenced by  ’s proposal. In the consensual model,   is informationally 
independent, while the   members are influenced by her proposal. Finally, in the opportunistic 
model it is   who is influenced by the other   members by basing her proposal on their 
preferences and disregarding her own preference to a certain extent. Note that the degree of 
informational influence is not related to how intense communication is prior to voting. The 
board members may in principle communicate a lot with each other prior to policy meeting but 
with low degree of informational influence and vice versa. 
 
Democratic model 
In this model of committee behaviour, chairman   plays the role of a democratic leader whose 
only special power is a proposal-making one. The proposal is based solely on  ’s own 
information set. The other committee members are free to express their own will by voting on 
her proposal, and  ’s behaviour has no effect on their own. In the language of our model, each 
 member   is assumed to vote based on the voting rule (2) using information set   
and extracting no information content from  ’s proposal. Given this behaviour,   solves her 
optimization problem (1) using information   and forming her expectation in a 
standard rational manner, i.e.  , where   is a standard expectation operator. Notice 
that this does not mean   offers her expected optimal policy rate   given her 
information set; she offers her proposal   taking into account the fact that its eventual acceptance 
(as opposed to the acceptance of the status quo  ) reveals information about the unobserved  . 
 
Consensual model 
In this model, chairman   is assumed to have a dominant position beyond her proposal-making 
power. Her dominant position makes the other   members too keen to adopt her point of view, 
since they assume that the information available to the chairman is superior. In the language of 
our model,  ’s proposal is a solution to (1) given information  , but with the 
expectation operator   not taking into account the fact that possible rejection or acceptance 
of   contains information about unknown  . In other words,  ’s proposal is the policy in     11
closest to  ’s expectation of  , i.e. closest to  . While not fully rational, this 
specification of the way in which C forms her expectations captures the notion that because she 
knows that the other committee members’ voting behaviour is strongly influenced by her own 
proposal she disregards the possible information content of that behaviour and proposes her 
optimal policy. 
 
To capture the notion that the   members adopt  ’s point of view, we assume that each   
member   votes based on voting rule (2), but when calculating the expected value of  ,   
extracts information from  ’s proposal. It is easy to see that the expectation can be written as 
, where   and   are, respectively, the lower and upper bounds on  ’s 
signal, as revealed by her proposal. We have decided to label this model consensual, since the 
extraction of information from  ’s proposal considerably reduces the level of heterogeneity of 
opinions within the committee. 
 
Opportunistic model 
In this model, we assume that   is opportunistic in consulting the other   members before the 
actual committee meeting. Once at the meeting,   then knows the most preferred policies of the 
other members and offers the policy she knows will be adopted by a supermajority of   of 
them. In the appendix, we provide a robustness check for a mere majority case to illustrate that 
this assumption is not binding for our results. In terms of our model, we assume that   knows 
the most preferred policy of each member  , which is the policy in   closest to  . 
Ordering those policies such that  , where   is the policy preferred 
by the median committee member, offering the policy adopted by a supermajority of   
amounts to, for the   case, offering   if   and offering   if  . The 
 case is analogous. An implicit assumption about the behaviour of each   member   is 
that his voting is given by voting rule (2) with the expectation computed using information set 
 and ignoring the information content of  ’s proposal. 
 
This model is inspired by Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010), who in their empirical investigation of 
several descriptive monetary policy committee decision-making models show that their 
‘consensual’ model fits the real world data best. In their model, the adopted policy is equal to the 
most preferred policy of the next-to-median member (the side depending on the position of the 
status quo) when this policy is sufficiently far away from the status quo. When this policy is close 
to the status quo, the adopted policy is indeed the status quo. This is what our opportunistic   12
model does, except that we label it differently, as in our model it captures the idea that the 
chairman’s objective is to offer a policy which would never be rejected and she achieves this by 
using her authority to consult individual committee members or, in an alternative interpretation, 
to speak last during the committee discussion, after the remaining members have expressed their 
preferred policies. 
 
The results from the experiments with the opportunistic model in which   offers the policy 
accepted by a mere majority   of the members are reported only for completeness in 
Appendix A1 (Tables 15 and 16). They are largely similar to the results of the opportunistic 
model presented above. Notice that a mere majority model is often used in the literature, as the 
accepted policy is equal to the policy most preferred by the median committee member. 
 
The three models just explained are also related to some of the models found in the existing 
literature. As already noted, our opportunistic model is similar to the ‘consensual’ model of 
Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010). Our simple majority version of the opportunistic model 
mentioned above is similar to the ‘frictionless’ model in Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010), to the 
‘individualistic’ model in Gerlach-Kristen (2008) and to the model in Weber (2010). In all those 
models, the adopted policy is equal to the policy preferred by the median committee member. 
Furthermore, our democratic model is similar to the ‘agenda-setting’ model of Riboni and Ruge-
Murcia (2010) in that the chairman proposes the policy that maximizes her expected utility 
among the policies she knows would be accepted. The key difference in our democratic model is 
that the acceptance is only probabilistic, as   does not know the signals of the other committee 
members. Finally, our consensual model is similar to the ‘autocratically collegial’ model in 
Gerlach-Kristen (2008) in that chairman proposes her most preferred policy and her authority 
makes the other committee members vote for her proposal. In the autocratically collegial model 
this is modelled as the other committee members having a ‘tolerance interval’ around their 
preferred policy, but in our model it is modelled as the other members considering the 
chairman’s point of view by extracting information from her signal. 
 
Intertemporal democratic model 
The fourth model is similar to the democratic model specified above in that each   committee 
member votes based on his private information only and does not extract any information from 
’s proposal, with   solving her optimization problem in a fully rational manner. As opposed to 
the democratic model, this model maintains the intertemporal link in the committee decision by   13
assuming that all the committee members take into account the effect of their current behaviour 
on their future decisions. This effect works through current policy determining the future status 
quo. Formally, this is achieved by setting  . 
 
A key problematic aspect in simulating the equilibrium of this model is the fact that  ’s proposal 
strategy maps   into  , and we would have to estimate the value functions   at each 
point of this space. With standard value function iteration on the discrete version of   the 
computational costs are prohibitive. To overcome this complication we set  , breaking the 
intertemporal link in the optimal monetary policy. As a result,  ’s proposal strategies will be a 
function of the current status quo   along with her signal   mapping   into  , which is 
considerably easier to simulate. We still have to derive the equilibrium value function   for all 
the board members, but we only need to know   at a discrete and rather coarse set of points 
sufficient for numerical integration over  , as the   set is already discrete. 
 
3.3 Model simulations 
For each version of the model of committee behaviour we generate 101 different random 100-
period-long paths. These are chosen so as to gain insights into the results and avoid inference 
based either on a low number or on short paths while still keeping the simulations manageable. 
With the simulation of one path in the (intertemporal) democratic model taking approximately 
one hour for   on a standard desktop computer (twice as much for  ) we see the 
choice of the number and length of paths as an appropriate trade-off between validity and 
manageability (simulations of the other models take considerably less time, while simulations of 




Along each path for every period we record the status quo  , the proposal   and the final policy 
 and calculate the   variable as defined in the introductory part. It is given by 
      (3) 
and allows us to run an ordered probit regression analogous to the one from the benchmark 
study Gerlach-Kirsten (2004), which we use later in our empirical part, in which the estimate of 
 shows the informative power of the   variable for future policy changes   
                                                                                       
6 We also tested stability of our results across sub-samples of the 101 paths with satisfactory results. For example, if 
we split the 101 paths into two halves, out of 292 p-values reported for the simulation exercise, only 13 cross the 10 
percent significance level in either of the two halves, relative to the results reported. Full results are available upon 
request.   14
   .       ( 4 )  
In order to make the results more comparable among the different models, we keep the values of 
the random variables fixed across the simulations of those models. That is, when simulating, say, 
the first path in the democratic model, the random values in the model are the same as when 
simulating the first path in the consensual, opportunistic or democratic intertemporal model. 
 
Following the discussion above, the simulation values of the parameters in the models are 
 and   for the democratic, consensual and opportunistic models (however, see the 
simulation robustness checks in Appendix A1 for the results with different values of  ) and 
 with   for the intertemporal democratic model. In all the models, we assume that 
the interest rate is set in steps of a quarter of a percentage point, that is, in all the models 
. 
 
Next, we need to specify values for the distributions of random shocks. The choice of   is 
driven by our attempt to match the standard deviation of the changes in the monetary policy rate 
in our empirical data. As   in our model eventually follows a similar process as  ,   will 
follow a similar process as  . With the standard deviation of   equal to   and 
the empirically observed standard deviation of changes in the monetary policy rate between   
and  , we set   to those two values. 
 
For the standard deviation of the board members’ signals   and  , we assume those to be 
either   or  , implying that approximately   of the board members’ signals are within   
or   basis points of the optimal interest rate. 
 
From the values above we construct several scenarios. Our baseline scenario assumes  , 
 and  . Interested in the comparative static properties, we further take 
,   and   in a ‘high volatility’ scenario,  ,   and 
 in a ‘bad information’ scenario, and finally  ,   and   in a ‘  
bad information’ scenario. Note that we could call this ‘P bad information’ scenario also ‘C 
superior information’ scenario, since we consider the relative noise in the C and P information 
sets. For the four scenarios just explained, we simulate the models for both   and   in 
order to see the effect of increasing committee size on the results. We have chosen committee 
sizes of   and  , as those are the most common central bank monetary policy committee sizes 
(Mahadeva and Sterne, 2000).   15
 
3.4 Simulation results 
Tables 1–3 show the results of our simulation exercise. Besides estimates of coefficients   and 
 from (4) averaged over the 101 paths, we include average standard errors and average p-values. 
The row labelled MSE is the average mean squared error between the enacted and optimal 
monetary policy, Votes proposal is the average number of votes for  ’s proposal, and No change is 
the average fraction of meetings resulting in no change in policy. Tables 1 and 2 show the results 
for the democratic, consensual, opportunistic and mechanical (see below) models for   and 
 respectively. Table 3 shows the results for the intertemporal democratic model. 
 
Before proceeding to the discussion of our results, we were interested to see whether we could 
generate the informative power of   with a purely mechanical model. In this model, policy   
in each period is equal to the policy in   closest to the optimal policy   and we calculate   
assuming that there are   dissenting members voting for the status quo  . We 
take   to be a random variable drawn anew for each committee meeting, with each value from 
 being equally likely. 
 
What is apparent from this mechanical model is that it cannot generate data in which   holds 
information about future monetary policy changes. This is because there is no uncertainty about 
the optimal policy in this model, and there is nearly no difficulty in deciding where to set interest 
rates (the only difficulty being the fixed size of the minimum policy rate change). What the row 
MSE also shows is the benchmark or minimum error in monetary policy stemming from the fact 
that the monetary policy rate is set in discrete steps. 
 
Looking at the democratic model results for the baseline scenario and   in Table 1, the 
average estimate of   shows the informative power of the   variable for future policy 
changes. The intuition for this result is the following. Assume that the optimal policy rate   has 
been constant for several periods at some value   and that the committee has been setting its 
policy   at the same level. Assume now that the optimal policy rate increases to some value  . 
The committee members receive imperfect information about this shock and several courses of 
action follow. If  ’s signal does not prompt her to offer a policy different from the current status 
quo  , the new policy   will be equal to the current status quo and hence the   variable will 
be equal to zero. 
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If, on the other hand,   offers proposal   close to the new optimal policy rate  , her proposal 
will be higher than the current status quo  . Depending on the votes of the other committee 
members, two possibilities arise. The first one is that  ’s proposal is approved. The new policy 
 will then be approximately equal to the optimal rate   and the   variable will be negative. 
But due to the fact that the optimal policy rate is an   process with relatively large  , it is 
approximately equally likely that the optimal rate will increase or decrease in the future. With 
monetary policy eventually following the optimal rate, it is then equally likely that the policy will 
increase or decrease in the future. The second possibility is that  ’s proposal is rejected. The new 
policy   will then be equal to the status quo   and the   variable will be positive. It is also 
more likely than not that the interest rate will increase in the future if it follows the optimal rate. 
The combination of an equal probability of increase and decrease in policy when   and a 
higher probability of increase when   is what gives the positive estimate of   (see also 
Figure 1 below and the surrounding text). 
 
The intuition just explained also reveals two conditions under which   holds information 
about future policy changes. The first condition is that monetary policy cannot follow the optimal 
rate precisely. This is apparent from the estimates for the mechanical model. The second 
condition is that there has to be a certain minimum degree of dissent in the committee. If all the 
committee members vote in the same way, the   variable will always be zero and hence 
cannot be informative about future policy changes. This is revealed by the estimates for the 
consensual and opportunistic models. In both of those models, information is shared among the 
committee members and hence their decision-making shows a low degree of dissent. This is also 
apparent from the high average votes for the proposal, which for both models is around   in a 
five-member committee. 
 
Nevertheless, the two conditions just explained are not enough for   to be informative about 
future policy changes. Inspecting the first column of Table 1 for the democratic model across the 
different scenarios, the informative power of   can disappear either in a volatile economic 
environment (the high volatility scenario) or in an environment in which central bankers possess 
imprecise information (the bad information scenario). Comparing the results for the bad 
information and   bad information scenarios then suggests that it is the precision in  ’s signal 
that is important for the informative power of  . 
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As already noted, the results for the other two models in Table 1 – the consensual and 
opportunistic ones – do not show any informational content in the   variable, despite the 
fact that some of the estimates for the consensual model come close to statistical significance on 
average. This holds despite the fact that the policy in these models is on average further away 
from its optimum than in the democratic model, or, in other words, the first condition for   
to be informative explained above holds. What both of these models lack is the second condition 
– independence in the behaviour of the committee members. 
 
We have already mentioned that high volatility of the economic environment or a lot of noise in 
the information of committee members can render   uninformative about future monetary 
policy changes even in the democratic model. However, turning our attention to Table 2, it is 
apparent that both effects can be overcome by increasing the committee size. The estimates of   
for the democratic model now become significant on average even in the high volatility and bad 
information scenarios. At the same time, an increase in the committee size does not change the 
insignificance of the estimates of   in the consensual and opportunistic models despite the fact 
that the average p-values increase for both models and all scenarios. 
 
Finally, with one exception the average estimates of   are not significant in Tables 1 and 2, 
suggesting that past changes in the interest rate do not predict future change in the interest rate in 
our model, despite the fact that some of the estimates for the opportunistic models, and for two 
scenarios also for the democratic model, come close to statistical significance. As further 
discussed in the empirical part, a significant estimate of   suggests an interest rate smoothing 
motive on the part of the monetary policy committee. It is then not surprising that the estimates 
are not significant, as the interest rate smoothing motive is not built into any of the theoretical 
models. An alternative explanation of the lagged policy change insignificance is that it is driven by 
the   assumption for the optimal policy rate. This is what the results of our simulation 
robustness checks suggest, as the lagged policy change becomes significant when the   
assumption is changed to  . Whether, both in theory and in reality, the significance of the 
lagged policy change is driven by the smoothing motive or by the structure of the underlying 
economic environment is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Table 1 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data with   and   
 
Model Democratic  Consensual  Opportunistic  Mechanical 
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 4.10  *  5.93  5.25  0.60 
  [1.63] (0.089)  [3.29] (0.175)  [6.40] (0.418)  [3.99] (0.435) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.75  0.07  1.63  -0.14 
  [0.53] (0.259)  [0.45] (0.520)  [0.74] (0.108)  [1.26] (0.451) 
MSE  0.027 0.033 0.033 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  2.92/0.43 4.64/0.41 4.83/0.59 ---/0.36 
High volatility scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( )  2.19 2.59 0.69 0.21 
  [1.04] (0.124)  [2.43] (0.364)  [3.65] (0.585)  [2.05] (0.444) 
Lagged policy change ( )  0.24 0.01 0.60 0.00 
  [0.24] (0.362)  [0.21] (0.515)  [0.29] (0.112)  [0.64] (0.462) 
MSE  0.043 0.049 0.044 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  3.46/0.28 4.62/0.24 4.78/0.37 ---/0.19 
Bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 3.43  6.84  6.05  --- 
  [1.50] (0.106)  [3.59] (0.148)  [6.47] (0.385)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.29  0.08  1.04  --- 
  [0.48] (0.435)  [0.46] (0.507)  [0.64] (0.203)  --- 
MSE 0.048  0.052  0.053  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  3.00/0.43 4.69/0.41 4.85/0.56  --- 
 bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 4.97  *  9.98  6.53  --- 
  [1.79] (0.055)  [6.24] (0.228)  [6.43] (0.356)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.82  -0.19  1.25  --- 
  [0.54] (0.228)  [0.42] (0.490)  [0.67] (0.128)  --- 
MSE 0.041  0.036  0.049  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  2.74/0.50 4.88/0.38 4.84/0.57  --- 
Note: Average ordered probit estimates over 101 random 100-period-long paths. [Average standard 
errors] and (average p-value). * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, 
*** statistically significant at 1% level based on average p-value. MSE is average mean squared 
difference between adopted and optimal policy. Votes proposal is average number of votes for
chairman’s proposal. No change is proportion of committee meetings with no policy change. 
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Table 2 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data with   and   
 
Model Democratic  Consensual  Opportunistic  Mechanical 
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 5.15  **  6.57  7.41  0.01 
  [1.66] (0.025)  [3.30] (0.156)  [5.30] (0.256)  [3.45] (0.510) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 1.08  0.14  2.05  *  -0.30 
  [0.56] (0.125)  [0.46] (0.490)  [0.81] (0.065)  [1.06] (0.541) 
MSE  0.026 0.032 0.030 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  3.90/0.45 6.46/0.42 6.62/0.57 ---/0.36 
High volatility scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 2.37  *  3.01  1.69  -0.03 
  [1.02] (0.085)  [2.43] (0.328)  [2.99] (0.449)  [1.76] (0.521) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.28  0.02  0.63  -0.07 
  [0.24] (0.311)  [0.21] (0.499)  [0.30] (0.115)  [0.54] (0.551) 
MSE  0.040 0.049 0.036 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  4.66/0.31 6.42/0.24 6.52/0.33 ---/0.19 
Bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 3.57  *  7.60  7.44  --- 
  [1.47] (0.079)  [3.67] (0.140)  [5.09] (0.261)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.40  0.15  1.16  --- 
  [0.49] (0.421)  [0.47] (0.460)  [0.65] (0.184)  --- 
MSE 0.047  0.052  0.051  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  4.04/0.44 6.54/0.41 6.67/0.52  --- 
 bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 5.31  **  12.42  7.86  --- 
  [1.71] (0.032)  [6.61] (0.174)  [5.08] (0.231)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 1.00  -0.13  1.36  --- 
  [0.55] (0.147)  [0.42] (0.517)  [0.68] (0.128)  --- 
MSE 0.041  0.036  0.048  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  3.66/0.51 6.82/0.37 6.66/0.54  --- 
Notes: See Table 1. 
 
To provide further intuition behind our results, Figure 1 shows a fraction of a typical simulated 
policy path for the three models from Tables 1 and 2. The solid line in both figures is the optimal 
monetary policy rate unknown to the central bank committee. The left figure then shows enacted 
policy in the democratic model along with  ’s proposals, and the right figure shows enacted   20
policy in the consensual and opportunistic models. We do not show the proposals for the two 
latter models, as they are always accepted in the opportunistic model and very often accepted in 
the consensual model (always accepted for the particular policies We choose this particular path 
as it produces the estimates closest to the average estimates shown for the democratic model in 
Table 1 for the baseline scenario. 
 
Figure 1 – Simulated Policy Paths 
 
Focusing first on the left figure shows why the   variable is informative about future changes 
of monetary policy in the democratic model. For periods 53–55 the enacted policy closely follows 
the optimal one, but then in period 56 the committee fails to increase the policy further to  ’s 
proposal of   because the proposed step seems too large to the other committee members. 
This generates a positive value for   in this period and suggests an increase of policy to   
in period 57. The right figure then shows why the   variable is not informative about future 
policy changes in the consensual and opportunistic models. In the consensual model chairman   
gets her proposal of   in period 56 approved, as her proposal reveals her high signal to the 
other committee members, who are influenced by it, so that the policy does not need to ‘catch 
up’ in the period 57. In the opportunistic model a similar thing happens, but with a policy of   
adopted instead. 
 
Intuitively, it might seem that the democratic model generates an informative value of   due 
to the failure of the committee to adopt higher policy in the period 56. While this is certainly true, 
notice that the other two models err in different situations. The consensual model errs in that  ’s 
proposals are too often accepted and hence the enacted policy reflects too much noise in  ’s 
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signals. This is evident from  ’s failure to propose higher policy in period 59 or the eventually 
accepted proposal for higher policy in period 61. The democratic model, on the other hand, 
guards against strong influence of the chairman, as evident by the rejection of the proposals in 
periods 58 and 61–63, all of which would have taken the policy further away from the optimal 
one. 
 
The opportunistic model errs in that it takes too long to form the super-majority of the 
committee needed to change the policy. This is evident from the no policy change in period 59 
and then the maintenance of policy at the   level until period 61 before changing it to   in 
period 62, with a smoother transition being more appropriate. 
 
What the figure also shows is that both the democratic and the consensual models generate 
policy paths that are somewhat more volatile than the policy path generated by the opportunistic 
model. From Tables 1 and 2, the democratic and consensual models on average, excluding the 
high volatility scenario, generate somewhere between 40 and 50 per cent of no policy change 
meetings, while the opportunistic model generates somewhere between 50 and 60 per cent of no 
policy change meetings. However, with the fraction of no policy change meetings in our data 
being 61% for Poland, 62% for Sweden, 65% for Hungary, 66% for the Czech Republic and 69% 
for the United Kingdom, this does not seem to be significant weakness of either of the two 
models. 
 
What the figure does not show, however, is the source of the no policy change meetings. As 
already noted in both consensual and opportunistic models,  ’s proposal is often accepted, 
implying that the source of no changes in policy is  ’s proposal being equal to the status quo. 
This, along with the voting behaviour, implies a high percentage (equal to the fraction of no 
change meetings for the opportunistic model and very close to the fraction of no change 
meetings for the consensual model in Tables 1 and 2) of meetings with no change in the policy 
rate with the decision being reached unanimously. On the other hand, in the democratic model 
’s proposal is almost never equal to the status quo policy and hence almost all the no change 
meetings are a result of  ’s proposal being rejected. As at least she votes for her proposal, none 
of the no change meetings reach this decision unanimously, which more closely resembles the 
empirically observed stylized facts. 
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Source of meetings with no policy change in the three models also reveals another intuition for 
the explanatory power of the   variable. Any meeting with unanimous decision generates 
zero   and as a result consensual and democratic models are associated with   variable 
with less variance relative to the democratic model. 
 
To check how robust our simulation results are, we repeated the simulations for the democratic, 
consensual, opportunistic and mechanical models either for different values of   compared to the 
benchmark results or changing the   process to an   process. The results are given in 
Tables 9–14 in Appendix A1. To summarize, the results change very little when we change 
 from the benchmark results to either   (Tables 9 and 10) or   (Tables 
11 and 12). When we change the benchmark   process to an   process (Tables 13 and 
14), the most notable change is that the average estimate of the lagged policy change becomes 
significant in most cases. Nevertheless,   still is informative about future policy changes only 
in the democratic model. 
 
Table 3 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data 
 
Model Intertemporal  Democratic 
     
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 1.98  2.36 
  [1.64] (0.338)  [1.66] (0.271) 
Lagged policy change ( )  -2.31 ***  -2.23 *** 
  [0.56] (0.002)  [0.58] (0.008) 
MSE 0.028  0.027 
Votes proposal  2.89  3.89 
Notes: See Table 1. 
 
Before we conclude the theoretical section, we turn our attention to the results for the 
intertemporal democratic model. Table 3 shows the simulation results for this model and the 
baseline scenario for both   and  . We decided not to include more results, as those 
come with considerable time costs and even the estimates for the baseline scenario show the 
main weakness of this model, which is a negative estimate of  . Intuitively, this result is driven 
by the fact that  . When the optimal rate increases to some value and monetary policy 
follows it, giving a positive policy change, it is highly likely that in the next period monetary   23
policy will have to be reversed, as the optimal rate is normally distributed around zero for  . 
Additionally, the average estimate of   in Table 3 is not significant, showing that breaking the 
intertemporal link in the optimal interest rate renders the   variable uninformative about 
future monetary policy. 
 
Overall, the model delivers several interesting policy implications. First, publishing the voting 
pattern of the monetary policy committee members is important if monetary policy is not always 
at its optimal level. This allows other economic agents to gain information about the future 
course of monetary policy in the form of the   variable. 
 
Second, the informative power of the   variable is not guaranteed automatically. What is 
needed is informational independence of the committee members. If all the committee members 
behave based on the same information or one of the committee members has enough authority 
for the other committee members to adopt his or her point of view, a high degree of consensus 
ensues and the   variable is rarely different from zero. 
 
Third, even with independently behaving central bankers, the   variable might not be 
informative. In a volatile economic environment, or when the monetary policy committee 
members possess imprecise information, it is important for the committee to have a sufficient 
number of members, as every additional committee member brings new information. 
 
4 Institutional Background 
This section gives information on the background of central bank committees’ decision-making 
about monetary policy. The bank boards typically meet on a monthly frequency and decide on 
the level of the repo rate. The frequency of monetary policy meetings varies. For example, the 
Bank of England and the Hungarian and Polish central banks meet monthly. The Czech National 
Bank used to meet monthly up to 2007 but has met eight times a year since 2008, the same as the 
Riksbank for the large part of our sample period. Occasionally, the central banks hold 
extraordinary policy meetings. 
 
The boards take decisions based on a majority vote. In the event of a tie, the chairperson (the 
governor, if present at the meeting) has the casting vote. The policy decision is announced on the 
same day. Minutes explaining the monetary policy decision, i.e. the voting of central bankers, are 
published approximately one or two weeks later. Except for Poland, the voting record is an   24
integral part of the minutes and summarizes the qualitative information contained in the minutes. 
In the case of Poland, the voting record appears no sooner than 6 weeks (and no later than 12 
weeks) after the policy meeting.
7 Polish case documents that the informative power of the voting 
records does not depend on the ex ante known publishing time lag. An in-depth study on voting 
records in Poland is provided by Sirchenko (2010).  
 
The voting results are typically attributed, but not always. For example, the voting ratio was 
released without an explicit statement on how the individual board members voted for the 
monetary policy decisions in the Czech Republic in 2000–2007. From mid-2000 to January 2006 
the (unattributed) voting record was published in the minutes only, while since February 2006 the 
voting record has been released at the press conference held about 3 hours after the 
announcement of the interest rate decision. In addition, the Czech National Bank has recently 
published the transcripts of its monetary policy meetings in 1998–2001, which include the voting 
record as well. Hence, the Czech case offers us a second natural experiment set-up in which we 
can test whether the voting ratio has a similar informative power to the full voting record. The 
results show that this is the case. The lesson learnt from the Czech case is therefore to publish at 
least the voting ratio if there are serious concerns about naming names. 
 
Disagreement among central bankers is common. The voting was not unanimous in 46% of cases 
for the Czech central bank, 70% for the Hungarian central bank, 46% for the Polish central bank, 
19% for the Swedish central bank and 59% for the Bank of England during our sample period. 
The frequency of unanimous voting depends to a certain extent on the size of the bank board, 
with Hungary having more than 10 members in the board during our sample. The typical 
magnitude of monetary policy rate change is 25 basis points. Other magnitudes are less common, 
although central banks decreased policy rates quite aggressively during the recent financial crisis, 
often by 50 or even 100 basis points at the meeting. Substantial policy rate changes of similar 
magnitude were also observed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland during the period of 
transition to a market economy, which was characterized by more volatile macroeconomic 
development. The data are further described in Appendices A2 and A3. 
 
                                                                                       
7 More specifically, if the repo rate was changed, the voting record is first published in the Court and Economic 
Gazette of the Ministry of Justice and only after that in the inflation report. Voting records have to be published in 
the Court and Economic Gazette no sooner than 6 weeks and no later than 12 weeks after the voting took place.   25
Figure 2 – Actual Voting Record Skew and Future Policy Rate Change 
Czech National Bank  Hungarian National Bank 
National Bank of Poland  Sveriges Riksbank 
Bank of England 
Note: Skew, plotted on the x-axis, is calculated as the difference between the average repo rate 
voted for by the individual board members and the actual repo rate at the next meeting. The 
future monetary policy rate change is plotted on the y-axis. Jitter is used for overlapping 
observations for expositional purposes. 
 
Figure 2 presents the link between the actual voting record skew and the future policy rate 
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give a noisy signal about future policy, for example when the rates are not changed and one 
board member dissents. When we look at the various signal-to-noise ratios, we see that there is a 
certain level of noise in an individual member’s voting record, but when more than one member 
dissents at the same policy meeting, the level of noise declines and is typically well above 50%.
8 
We perform a regression analysis in the following section to shed light on the extent to which the 
voting record gives systematic information for future policy. For the regression analysis, the 
future policy rate change is stacked in fewer categories, as large-magnitude policy changes happen 
rarely (more on this below). 
 
5 Empirical Methodology 
Our theoretical model shows when the voting record is likely to be informative for future policy 
changes. As regards the empirical methodology we follow the approach developed by Gerlach-
Kirsten (2004) to assess the predictions of our model. Gerlach-Kirsten (2004) analyses the voting 
record of the MPC of the Bank of England over the period 1997–2002, while we provide a more 
comprehensive international comparison. More specifically, we focus on the following five 
countries that conduct their policies within an inflation-targeting regime: the Czech Republic, the 
United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland and Sweden.  
 
Following our benchmark study Gerlach-Kirsten (2004), we define a measure of disagreement in 
the bank board, the variable  , as  
           (5) 
where   is the interest rate voted for by bank board member   at a monetary policy meeting at 
time  , and   denotes the monetary policy rate. This is an identical definition to equation (3) used 
in our theoretical models. However, for the sake of comparability with the benchmark study, we 
use here the benchmark notation for the policy interest rate  , while in the theoretical models we 
kept the notation typical for that stream of literature, where the policy tool is denoted  . We 
follow the benchmark study and assess whether the voting record reveals information on future 
monetary policy by estimating the following baseline regression model for each country 
separately. 
 
                                                                                       
8 More specifically, we calculate the signal-to-noise ratio as follows. When at least 25% of board members dissent – 
for example at least two members out of seven vote for higher rates – at a particular meeting and the rates are not 
changed, we classify the skew variable as giving the correct signal when the rates are increased at the next policy 
meeting. Calculating the signal-to-noise ratio in this way, the ratio is 71% for the Czech Republic, 67% for Hungary, 
64% for Poland, 80% for Sweden and 54% for the UK. The ratio is above 50%, indicating that the voting record 
gives more often a correct, rather than noisy, signal.   27
         (6) 
This equation is identical to equation (4) used in the theoretical part. Again, for the sake of 
comparability, we altered the notation for the policy interest rate. It is assumed in (6) that the 
interest rate decision is taken at time  . The votes are released at time  , i.e. in the period 
between the interest rate decisions at   and   (often together with the minutes, typically about 
two weeks after the interest rate decision at  ; it is worth emphasizing that we focus on the voting 
record, as this is the only quantitative information in the minutes; alternatively, one would have 
to classify the qualitative information contained in the minutes). Analogously to the theoretical 
models, we estimate (6) by an ordered probit technique to reflect the discrete nature of monetary 
policy rate changes. It is important to emphasize that the discrete dependent variable has been 
stacked in fewer categories, as some policy change magnitudes, such as 75 basis points, happened 
rarely. Therefore, the dependent variable was coded in four to five categories depending on the 
country and defined as follows: large decrease, decrease, no change, hike and large hike (-50, -25, 
0, +25 and +50 basis point changes respectively).
9  
 
According to our theoretical model, the coefficients   and   are expected to take positive 
values. As regards the sign of  , if some bank board members favour higher rates,   is 
positive and a future interest rate hike is more likely, conditional upon the voting record being 
informative for future policy. As regards the coefficient  , it reflects interest rate smoothing and 
the attempt of central bankers to avoid sudden policy reversals. If   is significant, we can infer 
that the voting record improves the explanatory power of a ‘naïve’ model which assumes only 
smoothing and reactions to shocks. We can also infer that the conditions identified by our 
theoretical model have been fulfilled and that the voting mechanism has been democratic. 
 
Our second baseline model extends this naive model by considering the information set available 
to the financial markets. We approximate their information set from the yield curve. While the 
naive model is directly comparable to the outcomes from our theoretical models, the second 
baseline model should be viewed as its extension. In this extension, we can test whether the 
information set available to the financial markets contains all the information sets available to the 
individual committee members. If the financial markets have an identical information set and 
evaluate the information at least as effectively as the central bank, the information content of the 
                                                                                       
9 The number of categories is set according to the log-likelihood of competing models. An alternative way would be 
to test whether the thresholds estimated within the ordered probit model differ significantly from each other. Note 
that the coding of the dependent variable substantially lowers the potential impact of vertical outliers. As concerns 
the potential impact of horizontal outliers, we estimate the regressions based on various sub-samples, with the results 
being affected minimally.   28
skew indicator should be built into the slope of the term structure of interest rates. In that case, 
parameter   would be insignificant in our second baseline model (as would   if interest rate 
smoothing is fully priced into the term structure). In the opposite case, the voting record reveals 
additional information to the financial markets. Our theoretical models also suggest other 
situations when   could be insignificant. Specifically, in periods of high volatility or under 
certain voting mechanisms the skew may be insignificant despite the fact that individual board 
members have valuable information sets. To assess these considerations formally, we estimate a 
regression of the following form:   
      (7) 
 
As compared to (6), equation (7) now includes an additional term to control for financial market 
expectations.   represents the slope of the term structure, where   and   denote the 
respective money market maturities
10 and it is assumed that   (following Gerlach-Kirsten, 
2004, we will consider various maturities).   denotes the time period between the interest rate 
decisions, and the data on   and   will be from the day before the release of the voting 
record (thus,  ). 
 
Regarding our two natural experiment set-ups, we can test whether   is informative in the 
period when voting records are disclosed with a considerable time lag, as in the aforementioned 
case of Poland. We can also test whether the voting ratio is informative when only unattributed 
voting records are available, as in the aforementioned case of the Czech Republic. 
 
We add two robustness checks to our baseline models. First, we extend the empirical 
specification by Gerlach-Kirsten (2004) to include a measure of dispersion in the voting records, 
which can serve as an indicator of the degree of uncertainty the board members face. We 
measure the dispersion of the voting results by the standard deviation of the individual votes.
11 
   (8) 
The sign of   is not clear-cut, although more uncertainty may trigger looser monetary policy 
(Soderstrom, 2002; Bekaert et al., 2010). Second, we also estimate Eq. (7) based on the data 
before the 2008–2009 financial crisis in order to test the sensitivity of the results. 
                                                                                       
10 An alternative would be to include interest rate futures or forwards, but these were not available for all the sample 
countries. 
11 The share of the largest minority could serve as an alternative measure.   29
6 Empirical Results 
This section gives the empirical results on whether the voting record is informative about future 
monetary policy. We first present our baseline estimates (Eqs. (6) and (7)) for all countries. 
Alternative specifications follow. 
 




Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary Poland Sweden UK
Sample 2000:7–2008:12 2005:10–2009:2 1998:2–2009:12 1999:1–2009:2 1997:6–2009:2
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)





































 (0.33)  (0.40)  (0.33) (0.33) (0.08) (0.14) (0.36) (0.39) (0.39) (0.29)




1.26*   1.52**
* 
 (1.15)  (1.36) (0.36) (0.74)  (0.49)
      
Adj. pseudo R-
squared 
0.24 0.20 0.34 0.49 0.13 0.33 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.32
Observations 100  75  40 40 142 108 90 90  142  142
Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level. Standard errors in parentheses. Ordered probit estimation. Term structure stands for difference between 1Y 
and 3M interbank rate in given country. Data for Czech Republic in column 2 until 2006:7 only. Data on 12M 
interbank rate in Poland is available only from 2001 onwards, therefore number of observations in column (6) is 
smaller than that in (5). 
 
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that the voting record is indeed informative about future 
policy rate changes. The lagged repo rate change is typically significant, suggesting that the central 
banks smooth interest rates to a certain extent and try to avoid sudden reversals in their policies. 
The variable   is statistically significant at conventional levels in all countries in the first 
baseline ‘naïve’ model as well as in the second baseline model with financial market expectations. 
The pseudo R-squared – the measure of regression fit – varies from 0.13 to 0.49. Our results for 
the UK confirm the previous empirical findings by Gerlach-Kirsten (2004). The significance of 
 indicates that the conditions identified by our theoretical model have been fulfilled. First, 
the chairmen in these central banks probably act as democratic leaders whose only special power 
is the proposal-making one and other committee members are free to express their own will by 
voting on the proposals of the chairmen, and the chairmen consider the voting of the other 
committee members informative. In other words, although we do not want to overemphasize our 
results it suggests that the democratic version of our theoretical model describes the real world   30
data most closely. Second, it is likely that in our sample period there was enough noise in the 
signals, and at the same time the committee members’ information sets were not distorted by 
excessively high economic volatility, given the size of the committee.  
 
In the case of Poland, where the voting record is published with a significant lag separately from 
the minutes and is not available before the next policy meeting,   carries additional 
information available only to board members, not to the financial markets. The adjusted pseudo 
R-squared increases from 0.23 in the specification with lagged policy rate changes and term 
structure to 0.33 in the specification with lagged policy rate changes, term structure and  . 
We therefore conclude that despite the time lag the skew indicator contains additional 
information that can be used by board members. Releasing voting records faster would be 
beneficial for transparency of monetary policy. 
 
The results for the Czech Republic use the data until 2006:7 in the specification with financial 
market expectations (column 2 in Table 4). The reason is that from this period onwards the 
voting record was released only about 3 hours after the monetary policy decision was announced. 
The monetary policy decision was typically announced at around 1 p.m. and the voting ratio was 
released at around 3.30 p.m. at a press conference. In principle, we could collect the interbank 
rates at say 2 p.m. and therefore use more recent data as well, but it has to be emphasized that the 
interbank market was not very liquid during the financial crisis. Therefore, we preferred to 
restrict the sample to 2006:7. The results for the Czech Republic also suggest that publishing the 
voting ratio (without an attributed voting record) may be sufficient to foster a better 
understanding of the future course of monetary policy. 
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Table 5 – Does the Voting Record Predict Repo Rate Changes? 
Alternative Specifications – Different Maturities in Term Structure and Uncertainty 
 
 
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary Poland Sweden UK
Sample 2000:7–2006:7 2005:10–2009:2 1998:2:2–2009:12 1999:1–2009:2 1997:6–2009:2
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lagged repo changes (b2) 0.08 0.45  1.22*** 0.88** 0.63*** 0.69*** 0.92*** 0.87*** 1.15*** 0.99***
 (0.43) (0.42)  (0.37) (0.40) (0.13) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19)
Skew (b1) 0.89** 1.14***  0.50* 0.48 0.35*** 0.60*** 1.48*** 1.29*** 1.70*** 1.54***
 (0.41) (0.40)  (0.28) (0.36) (0.09) (0.14) (0.37) (0.41) (0.29) (0.31)
Term structure (b3) 10.24***  2.48**  2.10 4.67*** 1.61*** 1.75*** 3.23** 1.24*  0.41*** 1.58***
 (2.87) (1.15)  (1.96) (1.73) (0.30) (0.41) (1.45) (0.74) (0.67) (0.50)
Dispersion (b4)   -0.93  -7.88* -1.03 0.93  -3.99*
   (2.54)  (4.51) (0.88) (2.85) (2.28)
      
Adj. pseudo R-squared 0.27 0.20  0.35 0.54 0.24 0.41 0.27  0.25 0.29 0.33
Observations 75 75  40 40 142 60 90 90  142 142
Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level. Standard errors in parentheses. Ordered probit estimation. Term structure stands for difference between 3M 
and 1M (1Y and 3M) interbank rate in odd (even) columns in given country. Data for Czech Republic in columns 1 
and 2 until 2006:7 only. Uncertainty stands for standard deviation of individual votes in bank board. Data on 12M 
interbank rate in Poland is available only from 2001 onwards, therefore number of observations in column (6) is 
smaller than that in (5). 
 
 
We also carried out a number of robustness checks. In the baseline specifications, the term 
structure was defined as the difference between the 12-month and 3-month interbank rate. 
Alternatively, the term structure is based on different maturities, defined in the regressions 
presented in Table 5 as the difference between the 3-month and 1-month interbank rate. The 
results remain largely unchanged.   remains statistically significant and its estimated size is 
largely similar. Similarly, introducing dispersion – a measure of disagreement in the board – as an 
additional explanatory variable does not change the interpretation of the baseline estimates. The 
dispersion is statistically significant at 10% level in Hungary and the UK. This suggests that a 
more dispersed opinion about policy rates is associated with a loosening of policy in these two 
countries. The dispersion in the other countries is insignificant. Table 6 reports the results based 
on the sample excluding the financial crisis period (up to 2007:7). Again, the results remain 
largely stable. Finally, we included the level of interest rates as additional regressor to tackle the 
issue that the increase in the policy rate by 0.25 if the rate is at, for example, 1% or when it is at 
5% can give different message to the public. Even after the inclusion of the level of interest rate, 
 remains statistically significant (these results are available upon request). 
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Table 6 – Does the Voting Record Predict Repo Rate Changes? 
Alternative Specifications – Data until Financial Crisis Only 
 
 
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary Poland Sweden UK
Sample 2000:7–2007:7 2005:10–2007:7 1998:2–2007:7 1999:1–2007:7 1997:6–2007:7
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lagged repo changes (b2) 1.24***  0.46  1.50*** 1.22 0.64*** 0.49** 1.01*** 0.67*** 0.99*** 0.46*
  (0.31) (0.42) (0.47) (0.80) (0.13) (0.20) (0.23) (0.27) (0.21) (0.25)
Skew (b1) 1.66***  1.14***  0.47 1.94** 0.28*** 0.62*** 1.39*** 0.84* 1.57*** 1.28***
  (0.35) (0.40) (0.47) (0.92) (0.08) (0.15) (0.28) (0.44) (0.29) (0.32)
Term structure (b3)   2.53**  8.08** 2.44*** 2.24**    2.99***
   (1.15)  (3.19) (0.47) (0.88)  (0.68)
       
Adj. pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.35 0.71 0.11 0.37 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.33
Observations 87 75  22 22 114 80 79 79  123 123
Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level. Standard errors in parentheses. Ordered probit estimation. Term structure stands for difference between 1Y 
and 3M interbank rate in given country. Data until 2007:7 exclude global financial crisis period. Data for Czech 
Republic in column 2 until 2006:7 only. Data on 12M interbank rate in Poland is available only from 2001 onwards, 
therefore number of observations in column (6) is smaller than that in (5). 
 
All in all, the results suggest that the voting record bears relevant information about future 
monetary policy for all the countries in our sample and, in consequence, serves as a useful tool 
for improving the transparency of monetary policy. 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we examine whether the voting records of central bank boards or monetary policy 
committees are informative about future monetary policy. We approach this issue from two 
angles. First, we develop a theoretical model of central bank decision-making where board 
members have non-homogeneous information sets and try to set policies so as to match the 
uncertain ‘state of the world’. The model contains an intertemporal link between decisions taken 
at different board meetings to reflect the nature of monetary policy-making in which the interest 
rate adopted at one board meeting becomes the status quo for the next board meeting. The 
model also assumes an intertemporal link in optimal policies that change only slowly over time. 
We investigate whether the voting pattern is informative about changes in the interest rate based 
on data simulated from this model. Three different versions of model are estimated with the 
simulated data: 1) democratic, 2) consensual and 3) opportunistic. In essence, these versions 
differ in the extent to which the chairman influences the voting of the other board members. In 
version 1, the chairman allows the other board members to express their opinions democratically, 
and there is sufficient independence in the voting across the board members. In version 2, the 
chairman has a dominant enough position to bring about a consensus. And in version 3, the   33
chairman votes opportunistically according to the majority of the other board members. The 
results show that only the democratic version of our model is able to generate significant 
correlations between the voting pattern and future policy changes. The results also show that the 
voting pattern resulting from democratic voting is informative only if there is sufficient noise in 
the signals.  
 
Second, the model predictions are tested on real data. For this reason, data on five inflation 
targeters (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) that release 
voting records are collected. It is found that in all these countries the voting records are indeed 
informative about future monetary policy and thus in principle improve monetary policy 
transparency. More specifically, it is found that if a minority votes for higher rates than the 
majority, it is more likely that there will be a rate hike at the following meeting. This result is 
robust to controlling for financial market expectations as well as different sample periods. The 
result for Poland suggest that committee members tend to put the same effort into forming their 
views no matter whether their voting is published soon after the meeting or after a longer period 
of time. Hence, releasing voting records faster would be beneficial for both the public and the 
central bank, which could gain credibility. 
 
Similarly to Gerlach-Kristen (2004) the results in this paper hold regardless of whether the voting 
record is attributed or not. In consequence, where there are concerns that attributed voting 
records might expose individual board members to some external pressure (such as in the case of 
a monetary union with board members not voting for national interests), the voting results can be 
published as non-attributed and still contribute to a better understanding of monetary policy. All 
in all, monetary policy transparency can be improved by releasing the voting record in a timely 
fashion. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A1 Derivation of Central Bank Board Decision-Making Model and 
Simulation Robustness Checks 
In this appendix we explain the models from the third part of the paper in more detail so that it 
becomes apparent how to generate  ’s proposals and  s’ voting behaviour. We further explain 
several aspects of our simulation exercise and the methods we used. 
 
First note that for all the models, equilibrium exists. This can be established for the three models 
with   using the simple backward induction argument. As there is no intertemporal link in 
the decisions, we can focus on a single period. Within this period, the   members move last and 
their behaviour is given by the specified voting condition. Knowing this,   derives her proposal 
 as a solution to her optimization problem. Finally, for the intertemporal democratic model, 
note that the policy space is finite and the existence of a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium 
follows from the arguments in Maskin and Tirole (2001). 
 
Throughout the explanation we will often work with a vector of random variables in our model. 
All those variables form a random vector   that has a multivariate 
normal distribution with – conditional on the information embedded in   – a mean equal to   
and a variance-covariance matrix equal to a matrix with the vector 
 on the main diagonal and all the off-diagonal elements 
equal to  . Often we will need to compute the conditional expectation of   given the specific 
value of one or more of its elements. For this we use the well known result for the multivariate 
normal distribution that states that for a vector of (possibly more than two) random variables 
 distributed according to   with   and  , where 
the partitioning of   and   conforms to the partition of  , the conditional distribution of 
 given a specific value of   is  , where   and 
. 
 
To simulate each of the models, we start in the first period, with the previous optimal interest 
rate and monetary policy rate being zero. In the simulations of the democratic, consensual and 
opportunistic models we restrict the policy space to be in the interval   so that with our   38
choice of   the policy space is equal to  . For the intertemporal 
democratic mode we restrict the policy space to be in   for the baseline scenario. We 
do not need to look at a larger policy space, as the optimal interest rate and players’ signals stay 
well away from its border. As explained in the text, it is also inconsequential that we allow the 
optimal interest rate and the monetary policy rate to attain negative values, as all the results and 
estimates are invariant to adding a constant to the optimal interest rate. 
 
The values of the random variables used in the simulations are kept constant across the different 
models. That is, when we simulate, say, the first path for the baseline scenario of the democratic 
model, the random variables used are the same as when simulating the first path of any other 
scenario for the same model or of any other model for the same scenario. This holds even across 
the   and   simulations, where we naturally have to add two more random variables 
for the two extra players, but the remaining random variables are kept the same. 
 
In the democratic model with  ,   and  , at the beginning of each period 
with status quo  , last-period optimal interest rate   and fresh draw of 
, we first need to derive  ’s proposal  . This will be given as a 
solution to the optimization problem  
          ( A 1 )  
where   is the policy adopted given proposal   and status quo  . The optimization problem 
can be rewritten as   
      (A2) 
where   is the event of   being accepted,   is the event of   being rejected and   is the 
probability of event  . 
 
Next, we will need to calculate the probability of offer   being accepted against status quo  ,  . 
In order to do so, chairman   knows, and we show below, that the remaining players will vote 
for   if and only if their signal is above (or below, but this case is symmetric) a certain cut-off that 
we denote here by  . The other relevant information that   has is her own signal   and the 
previous optimal interest rate  , hence we need to calculate the probability of at least     
members voting for   given   and  . The probability of, say, the first   members voting for   
is equal to   and is straightforward to calculate, 
as we know the distribution of the random vector   and can always transform it   39
into a problem of calculating   by multiplying the whole problem (that is 
the mean and variance-covariance matrix) by  , where there are   
negative ones and   positive ones. The probability can then be calculated using the 
standard cumulative distribution function of the multivariate normal distribution. Denoting the 
probability of the first   members accepting by  , the probability of accepting becomes 
. 
 
The key computational problem in simulating the democratic model is computing the expected 
value of   given  ’s signal  ,   and the event of   being accepted, as the event of accepting   
means that the signals   of   or more   members must have been above (or below) a certain 
threshold  . There are two results we use to make the computation simpler that are 
straightforward to prove. First, for random variable   and two mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
events   and   we have   
    
and the similar result for variance states that   
     
which greatly simplifies the calculation of some of the expressions below. 
 
Nevertheless, the key problem remains, as we need to calculate an expectation of the form 
. The first step is simple and amounts to 
calculating the distribution of   given   and  , which is  , with each 
element of   being equal to   and   being a matrix with the vector 
 on the main diagonal and   off the main diagonal. We 
then convert the problem into one of finding   using the technique just 
explained for the calculation of  . This leaves us with a multivariate truncated normal random 
vector with known mean and variance. To calculate the expectation we used the results in Tallis 
(1961) and Lee (1979) and wrote our own MATLAB function which calculates the expectation. 
We checked its correctness using the ‘tmvtnorm’ R-software package (see Wilhelm, 2010). 
 
With those results, we can expand the maximand in (A2) and use the rules for conditional 
expectations and variance given above, then we determine the value of the objective function for   40
each   using the function for the expectation of the truncated multivariate normal, finally 
determining the solution to  ’s optimization problem and hence her proposal. 
 
With  ’s proposal   determined, we can determine the voting behaviour of the remaining   
committee members. For each member   we use the voting rule (2) from the text adapted to the 
democratic model   
         ( A 3 )  
which rewrites as   
          ( A 4 )  
with  . This result also proves that each   member votes for   if and 
only if his signal is above (or below, depending on the position of the status quo) a certain cut-
off. With the voting pattern determined, we can calculate the   variable and proceed to the 
next period. 
 
In the consensual model with  ,   and  , at the beginning of each period 
with status quo  , last-period optimal interest rate   and fresh draw of 
, proposal   will be the policy most preferred by  . This is equal to 
the policy in   that is closest to  ’s expectation of   given her signal   and the previous 
optimal policy rate  . This expectation is equal to  . 
 
Next, we need to determine the behaviour of the   committee members. In the consensual 
model, each   member   will vote based on the voting rule (2) using his information about the 
previous optimal interest rate  , his private signal   and the information embedded in  ’s 
proposal  , hence the voting rule rewrites as   
          ( A 5 ) .  
 
It is easy to confirm that the information embedded in  ’s proposal is equal to an event of 
, where the lower bound of the interval is   
and the upper bound of the interval is  . Calculation of 
 is then easy using the law of iterated expectations, which allows us to 
rewrite the expression to  . The inner expectations are equal 
to  . Moreover, we know that the distribution of   given   and   is normal,   41
with mean   and variance  . The last result we use to calculate the 
expectations is that for random variable   distributed according to  . The conditional 
expectation of   given that   is given by 
, where   and   are, respectively, the 
probability density and cumulative distribution functions of the univariate standard normal 
distribution. With the voting pattern determined, we can calculate the   variable and proceed 
to the next period. 
 
In the opportunistic model with  ,   and  , the chairman   knows the most 
preferred policies of all the committee members. For each player  , this policy will be the policy 
in   closest to  ’s expectation of   given   and  , i.e. closest to  . At the 
beginning of each period with status quo   and last-period optimal interest rate  , given a fresh 
drawn of  , we will then have the vector of most preferred policies 
, which we order so that   for  , where we denote the 
policy most preferred by the median member by  . 
 
In the opportunistic model,  ’s proposal will be the policy which receives a super-majority of at 
least   members. It is easy to see that this will be the policy in the interval   (where the 
order is reversed if the status quo   is larger than  ) that is closest to   if such policy exists. 
Otherwise, the proposal will be equal to the status quo  . 
 
Next, we need to calculate the   variable. For this, we again use the voting rule (2) along with 
the assumption that player   does not extract any information content from proposal   and votes 
for   as opposed to voting for the status quo   if and only if  
          ( A 6 )  
with  . By construction,  ’s proposal is always accepted, with the number 
of votes for   being at least  . With the voting pattern and hence   determined, we 
move to the next period. 
 
Finally, in the intertemporal democratic model with  ,   and  , the previous-
period optimal interest rate   plays no role and hence the only relevant information is the current   42
status quo  . We again start each period of the simulation by drawing fresh values for 
. Next, we need to determine  ’s proposal. This will again be the 
solution to the optimization problem  
        ( A 7 )  
where   is the continuation value function of a game starting with the status quo   and 
’s signal  . The expression can again be rewritten as   
      (A8) 
where  , with   being a probability distribution function of 
univariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance equal to  . With   known 
(we explain its estimation below) we proceed similarly as in the democratic model, calculating the 
probability of   being accepted and the expected values in the maximand. The distribution of the 
random variables   given   is again  , with each element of   being 
equal to   and   being a matrix with vector   on the main 
diagonal and   off the main diagonal. 
 
The voting behaviour of   member   given status quo  , proposal   and signal   is again given 
by the voting rule (2), which for the intertemporal democratic model becomes   
      (A9) 
where   is the continuation value function of the   member from a game starting with the 
given status quo and signal. Note that this function is equal for all   players. This condition can 
be rewritten as  
        ( A 1 0 )  
with   and  , with   being a probability 
distribution function of univariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance equal to 
. With the voting pattern determined, we can calculate the   variable and proceed to 
the next period. 
 
It remains to explain how we determine the continuation value functions. Prior to running the 
simulations, we estimate the   and   functions by standard value function iteration. We 
start with   and   and determine both functions   and   in a 
general step   as follows.   43
 
For   we use numerical integration via the standard Gaussian quadrature method using the 
‘compecon’ toolbox described in Miranda and Fackler (2002). To determine   for a specific 
value of  , we determine the set of nodes for  ’s signals   (using   in practice) 
and for each signal   calculate   
   (A11) 
using the approach described above. The cut-off values for the calculation of the probability of 
acceptance are derived from the voting rule, which uses the   function. 
 
For   we use the same numerical integration approach, generating the set of  ’s signals and 
numerically integrating  . The only complication is that we need to 
determine the   function. For the specific status quo   and signal   of   player  , 
 gives the continuation value from the game starting with   and   and hence can be 
written as   
        ( A 1 2 )  
but the expectation operator hides considerable complexity. First,   does not know  ’s signal 
and hence her proposal. Second,   does not know whether the proposal will be accepted or not, 
and third,   does not know the next-period signal. Reconciling the third source of uncertainty is 
straightforward and the whole expression can be rewritten as   
         ( A 1 3 )  
with only the first two sources of uncertainty remaining. 
 
To resolve those we need to take expectations over  ’s signal, which will determine her proposal 
as well. Expanding the expectations operator thus gives   
   (A14) 
where the variable of integration is  ’s signal,   is  ’s proposal given her signal,   is the 
probability of this proposal being accepted, and   is the probability distribution function of 
’s signal. 
 
Hence, in order to get   we need to integrate twice, once over the distribution of  ’s signal 
(which will be normal, with mean zero and variance  ) and once over the distribution of   44
’s signal (which for a given value of   will be normal, with mean equal to   and variance 
equal to  ). Integrating numerically then amounts to generating a grid of discrete 
nodes in   with one dimension for  ’s signals and nodes   and the second 
dimension for  ’s signal and nodes   (again we use   in practice). 
 
For each node in   consisting of   we calculate   
      ( A 1 5 )  
which then allows us to calculate  . To calculate the expression, we first calculate  ’s 
proposal  . Given the proposal, we can calculate the probability of the proposal being 
accepted (with   taking into account his own voting behaviour) and, finally, the remaining 
expectations given acceptance or rejection. In the whole expression,   will condition on the 
information embedded in   and hence the appropriate conditional distribution of the 
remaining random variables in the model   is multivariate normal  , 
with each element of   being equal to   and   being a matrix with vector 
 on the main diagonal and   off the main 
diagonal. 
 
We iterate on   until  , where   is the usual 
sup norm. We experienced no problems with convergence, and the typical   needed was around 
 iterations. 
 
Next, we re-run the simulations of the democratic, consensual, opportunistic and mechanical 
models for different parameter values compared to those in the main part of the paper. First, we 
changed the benchmark   to  , second we changed the benchmark   to 
, and third we changed the underlying   process for optimal policy to  . In 
this specification, it evolves according to   and we picked   and 
 following Gerlach-Kristen (2008). Note that the model changes only in that   in 
the expressions for expectations changes to  . With the   process governing 
the optimal policy we also had to change the standard deviation of the underlying shocks, but 
followed the same rationale as in the benchmark model. That is,   has a standard deviation of   45
, hence in order to match the observed standard deviation of the policy 
changes between   and   we set   in the baseline scenario and correspondingly 
decreased the noise in the committee signals to   and  , doubling those values 
when appropriate for the other scenarios. The results of the simulations are given in Tables 9–14, 
with the following Tables 15 and 16 showing the results of the simulations for the opportunistic 
model with a simple majority as opposed to the super-majority used in the benchmark 
simulations. 
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Table 9 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data with   and   
 
Model Democratic  Consensual  Opportunistic  Mechanical 
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 4.16  *  5.90  6.22  0.05 
  [1.64] (0.074)  [3.24] (0.159)  [6.56] (0.391)  [3.94] (0.438) 
Lagged policy change ( )  0.65 -0.02 1.62 -0.38 
  [0.54] (0.305)  [0.46] (0.548)  [0.77] (0.107)  [1.24] (0.459) 
MSE  0.027 0.033 0.034 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  2.91/0.43 4.63/0.41 4.83/0.59 ---/0.36 
High volatility scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( )  2.20 3.05 0.91 0.21 
  [1.06] (0.118)  [2.50] (0.303)  [3.65] (0.506)  [2.03] (0.424) 
Lagged policy change ( )  0.17 -0.04 0.54 -0.04 
  [0.24] (0.454)  [0.21] (0.534)  [0.29] (0.155)  [0.64] (0.455) 
MSE  0.041 0.050 0.045 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  3.48/0.28 4.62/0.24 4.78/0.37 ---/0.19 
Bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 3.43  *  6.79  6.50  --- 
  [1.52] (0.100)  [3.58] (0.164)  [6.53] (0.349)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.19  -0.03  1.00  --- 
  [0.49] (0.514)  [0.47] (0.505)  [0.67] (0.248)  --- 
MSE 0.048  0.052  0.052  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  2.97/0.43 4.69/0.42 4.85/0.57  --- 
 bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 4.93  **  8.86  7.36  --- 
  [1.78] (0.036)  [6.25] (0.250)  [6.57] (0.335)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.76  -0.28  1.22  --- 
  [0.56] (0.284)  [0.42] (0.473)  [0.70] (0.181)  --- 
MSE 0.041  0.036  0.050  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  2.70/0.51 4.88/0.37 4.84/0.58  --- 
Note: Average ordered probit estimates over 101 random 100-period-long paths. [Average standard 
errors] and (average p-value). * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, 
*** statistically significant at 1% level based on average p-value. MSE is average mean squared 
difference between adopted and optimal policy. Votes proposal is average number of votes for
chairman’s proposal. No change is proportion of committee meetings with no policy change. 
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Table 10 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data with   and   
 
Model Democratic  Consensual  Opportunistic  Mechanical 
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 5.07  **  6.57  7.65  -0.02 
  [1.65] (0.025)  [3.25] (0.130)  [5.40] (0.257)  [3.39] (0.513) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 1.00  0.06  1.98  -0.39 
  [0.56] (0.172)  [0.46] (0.516)  [0.85] (0.102)  [1.04] (0.530) 
MSE  0.026 0.033 0.030 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  3.85/0.47 6.45/0.41 6.62/0.57 ---/0.36 
High volatility scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 2.38  *  3.25  1.86  -0.05 
  [1.03] (0.096)  [2.45] (0.302)  [3.04] (0.421)  [1.75] (0.514) 
Lagged policy change ( )  0.21 -0.03 0.54 -0.12 
  [0.24] (0.451)  [0.21] (0.529)  [0.30] (0.164)  [0.54] (0.555) 
MSE  0.039 0.049 0.036 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  4.69/0.30 6.42/0.24 6.53/0.34 ---/0.19 
Bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 3.62  *  7.53  6.70  --- 
  [1.49] (0.079)  [3.63] (0.133)  [5.23] (0.305)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.33  0.05  1.11  --- 
  [0.51] (0.450)  [0.48] (0.500)  [0.69] (0.218)  --- 
MSE 0.047  0.052  0.050  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  3.94/0.46 6.53/0.42 6.67/0.54  --- 
 bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 5.56  **  11.17  7.73  --- 
  [1.72] (0.017)  [6.57] (0.206)  [5.26] (0.274)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.94  -0.22  1.28  --- 
  [0.57] (0.194)  [0.43] (0.518)  [0.72] (0.182)  --- 
MSE 0.041  0.036  0.048  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  3.60/0.52 6.82/0.37 6.66/0.55  --- 
Notes: See Table 9. 
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Table 11 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data with   and   
 
Model Democratic  Consensual  Opportunistic  Mechanical 
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 4.30  *  6.33  7.06  0.52 
  [1.65] (0.065)  [3.25] (0.152)  [6.31] (0.351)  [4.05] (0.435) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.78  0.15  1.86  *  -0.11 
  [0.53] (0.237)  [0.45] (0.511)  [0.73] (0.068)  [1.28] (0.485) 
MSE  0.027 0.033 0.033 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  2.94/0.42 4.64/0.41 4.83/0.58 ---/0.37 
High volatility scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( )  2.16 2.68 0.77 0.05 
  [1.05] (0.140)  [2.48] (0.373)  [3.60] (0.523)  [2.07] (0.438) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.29  0.04  0.66  *  -0.01 
  [0.24] (0.344)  [0.21] (0.494)  [0.29] (0.090)  [0.65] (0.472) 
MSE  0.041 0.050 0.045 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  3.45/0.28 4.61/0.24 4.78/0.37 ---/0.19 
Bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 3.58  7.01  5.67  --- 
  [1.53] (0.103)  [3.67] (0.160)  [6.19] (0.410)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.38  0.11  1.06  --- 
  [0.47] (0.390)  [0.45] (0.457)  [0.61] (0.207)  --- 
MSE 0.049  0.052  0.052  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  3.05/0.41 4.70/0.39 4.84/0.53  --- 
 bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 4.83  *  8.77  6.46  --- 
  [1.76] (0.056)  [6.08] (0.279)  [6.16] (0.334)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.87  -0.14  1.33  --- 
  [0.53] (0.228)  [0.41] (0.492)  [0.64] (0.134)  --- 
MSE 0.041  0.036  0.049  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  2.78/0.49 4.88/0.37 4.83/0.55  --- 
Notes: See Table 9. 
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Table 12 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data with   and   
 
Model Democratic  Consensual  Opportunistic  Mechanical 
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 4.94  **  6.70  8.16  0.12 
  [1.66] (0.029)  [3.24] (0.128)  [5.21] (0.255)  [3.49] (0.502) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 1.12  0.22 2.20  ** -0.23 
  [0.55] (0.128)  [0.45] (0.470)  [0.80] (0.047)  [1.08] (0.504) 
MSE  0.026 0.033 0.029 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  3.92/0.45 6.46/0.41 6.61/0.56 ---/0.37 
High volatility scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( )  2.35 2.91 1.39 0.06 
  [1.02] (0.108)  [2.48] (0.318)  [2.92] (0.466)  [1.78] (0.507) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.33  0.05  0.65  -0.01 
  [0.25] (0.284)  [0.21] (0.500)  [0.31] (0.111)  [0.54] (0.535) 
MSE  0.040 0.049 0.036 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  4.64/0.31 6.41/0.24 6.50/0.33 ---/0.19 
Bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 3.59  *  8.24  6.22  --- 
  [1.48] (0.069)  [3.66] (0.114)  [5.05] (0.292)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.46  0.21  1.15  --- 
  [0.48] (0.388)  [0.45] (0.422)  [0.63] (0.166)  --- 
MSE 0.048  0.039  0.050  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  4.07/0.44 6.55/0.39 6.67/0.51  --- 
 bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 5.23  **  11.56  6.69  --- 
  [1.70] (0.024)  [6.45] (0.174)  [5.04] (0.271)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( ) 1.04  -0.07  1.38  --- 
  [0.54] (0.148)  [0.42] (0.516)  [0.66] (0.108)  --- 
MSE 0.041  0.036  0.047  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  3.71/0.51 6.82/0.36 6.65/0.52  --- 
Notes: See Table 9. 
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Table 13 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data with   and  ,   
 
Model Democratic  Consensual  Opportunistic  Mechanical 
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 12.88  ***  14.95  19.38  -0.31 
  [3.03] (0.002)  [8.37] (0.138)  [11.81] (0.177)  [5.89] (0.550) 
Lagged policy change ( )  4.40 ***  3.62 **  4.02 **  3.57 
  [0.72] (0.008)  [0.85] (0.034)  [0.90] (0.032)  [1.90] (0.186) 
MSE  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  3.23/0.47 4.92/0.47 4.95/0.48 ---/0.48 
High volatility scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( )  5.96 15.21  19.04 0.14 
  [2.50] (0.107)  [8.28] (0.145)  [10.77] (0.173)  [3.23] (0.489) 
Lagged policy change ( )  4.10 ***  3.77 **  4.18 **  4.09 ** 
  [0.44] (0.000)  [0.72] (0.030)  [0.65] (0.020)  [1.07] (0.018) 
MSE  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  4.18/0.27 4.92/0.28 4.95/0.29 ---/0.27 
Bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 13.69  ***  16.25  17.35  --- 
  [3.05] (0.006)  [11.07] (0.155) [12.60]  (0.259)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( )  4.18 ***  3.40 **  3.52 *  --- 
  [0.70] (0.006)  [0.83] (0.039)  [1.04] (0.053)  --- 
MSE 0.007  0.007  0.007  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  3.15/0.46 4.94/0.46 4.96/0.48  --- 
 bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 16.12  ***  14.59  19.76  --- 
 [3.68]  (0.007)  [138.32]  (0.470) [12.08] (0.174)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( )  4.25 ***  2.63  3.75 **  --- 
  [0.70] (0.003)  [2.67] (0.239)  [0.77] (0.022)  --- 
MSE 0.007  0.007  0.007  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  3.82/0.48 4.98/0.46 4.95/0.48  --- 
Notes: See Table 9. 
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Table 14 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Estimates Using Simulated Data with   and  ,   
 
Model Democratic  Consensual  Opportunistic  Mechanical 
Baseline scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 17.56  ***  16.49  18.38  0.26 
  [3.55] (0.000)  [8.67] (0.106)  [9.53] (0.106)  [5.09] (0.525) 
Lagged policy change ( )  5.02 ***  3.75 **  4.19 ***  3.71 
  [0.79] (0.003)  [0.67] (0.014)  [0.72] (0.009)  [1.61] (0.125) 
MSE  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  4.13/0.47 6.88/0.47 6.90/0.48 ---/0.48 
High volatility scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 10.09  **  15.50  16.70  -0.21 
  [3.10] (0.025)  [8.52] (0.142)  [8.74] (0.114)  [2.78] (0.543) 
Lagged policy change ( )  4.30 ***  3.83 **  4.37 ***  3.98 ** 
  [0.45] (0.000)  [0.62] (0.020)  [0.46] (0.000)  [0.90] (0.017) 
MSE  0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 
Votes proposal/No change  5.33/0.27 6.88/0.28 6.89/0.29 ---/0.27 
Bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 16.22  ***  17.79  17.53  --- 
  [3.56] (0.000)  [9.88] (0.129) [10.26]  (0.163)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( )  4.27 ***  3.54 **  3.70 **  --- 
  [0.70] (0.005)  [0.65] (0.018)  [0.76] (0.023)  --- 
MSE 0.007  0.007  0.007  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  4.31/0.46 6.90/0.46 6.92/0.47  --- 
 bad information scenario ( ,  ,  ) 
Skew ( ) 17.63  ***  21.99  18.10  --- 
  [3.95] (0.001)  [192.17] (0.369) [9.84] (0.153)  --- 
Lagged policy change ( )  4.33 ***  3.05  3.81 **  --- 
  [0.71] (0.002)  [1.75] (0.139)  [0.78] (0.022)  --- 
MSE 0.007  0.007  0.007  --- 
Votes proposal/No change  4.93/0.48 6.97/0.46 6.91/0.47  --- 
Notes: See Table 9. 
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Table 15 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Opportunistic Model with Simple Majority, Estimates Using Simulated Data with   
 
        , 
 
Baseline scenario 
Skew ( ) 6.58  6.53  6.58  13.65  * 
  [3.19] (0.142)  [3.22] (0.135)  [3.14] (0.123)  [6.03] (0.060) 
Lagged policy change ( )  1.51  1.45  1.65 *  4.19 ** 
  [0.72] (0.120)  [0.75] (0.133)  [0.72] (0.083)  [0.72] (0.011) 
MSE  0.024 0.025 0.025 0.006 
Votes proposal/No change  4.46/0.45 4.46/0.46 4.45/0.44 4.87/0.47 
High volatility scenario 
Skew ( ) 1.82  1.77  1.76  12.12  * 
  [1.78] (0.365)  [1.78] (0.363)  [1.79] (0.392)  [5.35] (0.075) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.37  0.28  0.40 4.33  *** 
  [0.27] (0.267)  [0.27] (0.340)  [0.28] (0.236)  [0.46] (0.000) 
MSE  0.026 0.026 0.026 0.006 
Votes proposal/No change  4.38/0.22 4.38/0.23 4.37/0.22 4.87/0.27 
Bad information scenario 
Skew ( ) 5.11  5.71  5.23  13.22 
  [3.11] (0.193)  [3.22] (0.187)  [3.09] (0.197)  [6.65] (0.123) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.70  0.72  0.76 3.69  ** 
  [0.59] (0.317)  [0.62] (0.317)  [0.57] (0.280)  [0.67] (0.015) 
MSE  0.048 0.048 0.047 0.007 
Votes proposal/No change  4.56/0.43 4.56/0.45 4.56/0.42 4.90/0.46 
 bad information scenario 
Skew ( ) 5.90  5.89  5.65  13.24  * 
  [3.13] (0.162)  [3.24] (0.181)  [3.07] (0.148)  [6.36] (0.098) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.95  0.95  1.00 3.82  ** 
  [0.63] (0.237)  [0.66] (0.244)  [0.60] (0.186)  [0.68] (0.014) 
MSE  0.044 0.043 0.043 0.007 
Votes proposal/No change  4.53/0.44 4.53/0.46 4.53/0.43 4.89/0.46 
Note: Average ordered probit estimates over 101 random 100-period-long paths. [Average standard 
errors] and (average p-value). * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level,
*** statistically significant at 1% level based on average p-value. MSE is average mean squared 
difference between adopted and optimal policy. Votes proposal is average number of votes for
chairman’s proposal. No change is proportion of committee meetings with no policy change. Values of
,   and   depend on  , but correspond to those in previous tables. 
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Table 16 – Does the Voting Record Predict Policy Rate Changes? 
Opportunistic Model with Simple Majority, Estimates Using Simulated Data with   
 
        , 
 
Baseline scenario 
Skew ( )  7.66  7.35 *  7.73  13.51 * 
  [3.36] (0.109)  [3.37] (0.090)  [3.34] (0.115)  [5.90] (0.065) 
Lagged policy change ( )  1.99 *  1.88 *  2.13 **  4.24 ** 
  [0.79] (0.052)  [0.81] (0.063)  [0.79] (0.047)  [0.73] (0.014) 
MSE  0.024 0.024 0.024 0.006 
Votes proposal/No change  6.21/0.46 6.21/0.47 6.21/0.46 6.81/0.47 
High volatility scenario 
Skew ( ) 2.11  2.03  2.10  12.43  * 
  [1.86] (0.330)  [1.88] (0.333)  [1.88] (0.332)  [5.21] (0.060) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.44  0.38  0.50 4.39  *** 
  [0.29] (0.237)  [0.29] (0.288)  [0.29] (0.202)  [0.46] (0.000) 
MSE  0.023 0.023 0.023 0.006 
Votes proposal/No change  6.06/0.22 6.08/0.23 6.06/0.22 6.80/0.27 
Bad information scenario 
Skew ( ) 5.65  6.08  5.58  13.23 
  [3.16] (0.170)  [3.28] (0.166)  [3.13] (0.183)  [6.27] (0.104) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 0.85  0.86  0.92 3.76  ** 
  [0.62] (0.260)  [0.65] (0.305)  [0.59] (0.243)  [0.68] (0.015) 
MSE  0.047 0.047 0.047 0.007 
Votes proposal/No change  6.34/0.43 6.35/0.45 6.35/0.42 6.85/0.46 
 bad information scenario 
Skew ( ) 6.14  6.51  6.01  13.53  * 
  [3.18] (0.156)  [3.30] (0.156)  [3.14] (0.147)  [6.11] (0.083) 
Lagged policy change ( ) 1.04  1.10  1.14 3.86  ** 
  [0.64] (0.216)  [0.69] (0.218)  [0.63] (0.170)  [0.69] (0.013) 
MSE  0.044 0.044 0.044 0.007 
Votes proposal/No change  6.31/0.43 6.32/0.46 6.31/0.43 6.83/0.46 
Notes: See Table 15. 
   54
A2 Data 
Voting records 
Voting records were collected from the following central banks (start and end dates of the sample 
in brackets): the Czech Republic (1998:1–2008:12), the United Kingdom (1997:6–2009:2), 
Hungary (2005:10–2009:2), Poland (2000:2–2008:12) and Sweden (1999:1–2009:2). Typically, 
voting data are available at a monthly frequency.  
 
As regards the Czech Republic, the 1998:1–2000:4 voting results were available only in transcripts 
that are published with a 6-year delay. Therefore, the baseline estimates for this country are based 
on the data from 2000:7 onwards. In addition, the baseline estimates for the Czech Republic are 
restricted until 2006:7 in the specification with financial market expectations. The reason is that 
from this period onwards the voting record was released only about 3 hours after the monetary 
policy decision was announced. The monetary policy decision was typically announced at around 
1 p.m. and the voting ratio was released at around 3.30 p.m. at a press conference. In principle, 
the interbank rates could have been collected at, say, 2 p.m. and therefore more recent data could 
have been used as well, but it has to be emphasized that the interbank market was not very liquid 
during the financial crisis. In light of this fact, we restrict the data for the Czech Republic to the 
period until 2006:7. 
 
Interbank rates 
Interbank rates are collected to capture financial market expectations. The source of the data is 
Datastream. Specifically, we use PRIBOR rates for the Czech Republic, BUBOR rates for 
Hungary, WIBOR rates for Poland, STIBOR rates for Sweden and LIBOR rates for the UK for 
the following maturities: 1 month, 3 months and 12 months.  
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A3 Central Banks’ Voting Record Release Schedules 
Czech National Bank 
The Bank Board meets on Thursdays.
12 A press conference with a presentation containing the 
voting ratio (without the names) takes place the same day in the early afternoon. 
Until 8/2006, the voting ratio was not disclosed at the press conference. 
The minutes are released the next Friday (+8 days). They contain the voting ratio, and since 
1/2008 have also included the names explicitly. 
Until 4/2005, the minutes were released on Tuesdays, two weeks after the meetings (+12 days). 
Bank of England 
The Monetary Policy Committee decides during a two-day meeting that takes place on 
Wednesdays and Thursdays. A press release of the decision follows at midday on Thursday. 
The minutes are released two weeks later, on Wednesdays (+13 days). They contain the voting 
record with names. 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
The Monetary Council meets on Mondays. A press release of the decision follows on Monday at 
3 p.m. 
The minutes are released 2–4 weeks after the decision, usually on Wednesdays. They contain the 
detailed voting record with names. 
National Bank of Poland 
The Monetary Policy Council decides during a two-day meeting that takes place on Tuesdays-and 
Wednesdays. A press release of the decision follows on Wednesday. 
The minutes are released on Thursdays in the week before the next MPC meeting, which means 
3–4 weeks after the decision. 
The MPC meeting minutes do not contain the voting records. The voting records are published 
only later, in the quarterly inflation reports. If the repo rate was changed, the voting record is first 
published in the Court and Economic Gazette of the Ministry of Justice and only after that in the 
inflation report. Voting records have to be published in the Court and Economic Gazette no 
sooner than 6 weeks and no later than 12 weeks after the voting took place. 
Sveriges Riksbank 
The Executive Board meets on Mondays or Wednesdays. A press release of the decision follows 
the same day. 
The minutes are released approximately two weeks later (+14, or occasionally +15, days). They 
contain a detailed voting record with names. 
 
                                                                                       
12 There are some exceptions to the described organization of monetary policy decision-making processes for all the 
central banks, typically because of national holidays. For example, in the case of the Czech National Bank, the board 
usually meets on a Thursday. In exceptional cases, however, it may meet on a Wednesday instead of a Thursday 
because of holidays. Since 4/2005, the minutes have been published 8 days after the meeting. In the case of holidays, 
the minutes can be published more than 8 days after the meeting.  
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